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Abstract: 
The link, if any, between creativity and mental illness is one of the most controversial topics in modern 
creativity research. The present research assessed the relationships between anxiety and depression symptom 
dimensions and several facets of creativity: divergent thinking, creative self-concepts, everyday creative 
behaviors, and creative accomplishments. Latent variable models estimated effect sizes and their confidence 
intervals. Overall, measures of anxiety, depression, and social anxiety predicted little variance in creativity. Few 
models explained more than 3% of the variance, and the effect sizes were small and inconsistent in direction. 
Keywords: creativity, mood disorders, depression, anxiety, social anxiety, latent variable models 
 
Article: 
Asking if creativity is linked to mental illness is like asking if there is a dog breed that fits your personality or if 
there is a journal that will publish your dissertation study—the sheer number of possibilities makes us reluctant 
to simply say no. Both creativity and mental illness are vast, abstract concepts. There are many disorders and 
many domains of creativity: crossing the different disorders with the different creative domains yields a massive 
Disorder by Creativity matrix. This huge matrix can be multiplied if researchers believe that both mental illness 
and creativity can vary in amount, not just in kind. 
 
For these reasons, Silvia and Kaufman (in press) suggest that the typical question—―Is creativity linked to 
mental illness?‖—is too broad to be productive. More focused questions— such as questions concerning 
specific disorders, domains, developmental periods, and levels— are more likely to illuminate how creativity 
and mental illness intersect, if at all. Over time, this brick-by-brick approach will yield the raw material for 
meta-analyses, which will provide a quantitative grounding for this controversial area. 
 
In the present research, we focused on the dimensions of depression and anxiety because major depression and 
the anxiety disorders have high base rates and are among the most common mental disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Kessler et al., 1994). Moreover, despite their widespread prevalence, anxiety and 
unipolar depression have attracted relatively little interest from creativity researchers, as shown in recent 
reviews of this topic (Kaufman, 2009; Silvia & Kaufman, in press; Weisberg, 2006). Thus, one of the primary 
goals of this project was to explore whether symptom dimensions of the most common mental disorders are 
associated with dimensions of creativity. 
 
Our work was exploratory in two senses. First, we cast a broad net by assessing several dimensions of anxiety 
and depression and by including a wide range of creativity tasks and measures. Second, we didn’t have 
predictions, commitments, or prejudices about what we would find—we don’t have a horse (or a stoic, 
exploited greyhound) in this race. (Indeed, our indifference to whether creativity covaries with mental illness is 
unseemly for a creativity researcher and a clinical psychologist.) This important problem arouses strong feelings 
in creativity researchers, but we think it would benefit from a disinterested and pragmatic approach. Exploratory 
research of high methodological quality can build a base of knowledge for future meta-analyses. To foster such 
synthesis, we emphasize effect sizes and their confidence intervals in our research. 
 
Depression and Creativity 
Despite its prevalence, unipolar depression hasn’t received much attention in creativity research. In contrast, the 
dimensions associated with disorders of thought and with mood variability —particularly positive-symptom 
schizotypy and the bipolar spectrum—have received much more attention (see Batey & Furnham, 2008; 
Jamison, 1989; Kinney & Richards, 2007), even though these disorders are far less common in the general 
population (American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Kessler et al., 1994). Moreover, the findings from the 
limited research that has been conducted on the relationship between creativity and depression have been 
inconsistent. 
 
For example, in a broad study of creativity and subclinical spectrum traits, Schuldberg (2000-2001) found 
evidence that depressive symptoms were negatively related to creativity. Depression was measured with the 
MMPI-2 Depression scale; creativity was measured with many measures of creative traits and everyday 
creativity. Small negative effects (rs around -.15 to -.20) appeared for several of the creativity measures. In a 
later study, however, past depressive symptoms modestly predicted higher divergent thinking scores and more 
creative interests, and self-reflective rumination mediated these effects (Verhaeghen, Joorman, & Khan, 2005). 
 
Studies of clinical samples and creative samples are just as mixed. In a classic study, Andreasen (1987) found 
that creative writers were more likely to have had ―any affective disorder‖ than a sample of matched controls. 
Santosa et al. (2007), however, found no differences between people diagnosed with major depression and 
people classified as ―healthy controls‖ on the Barron–Welsh Art Scale, the figural and verbal components of the 
Torrance Tests, or the ACL creative personality scale. Taken together, the evidence for a depression– creativity 
link is clearly inconsistent. 
 
Anxiety and Creativity 
Even less is known about the relationship between anxiety and creativity, perhaps because anxiety falls outside 
of the ―mad genius‖ stereotype. Rubinstein (2008) reported that patients diagnosed with anxiety, depression, or 
personality disorders had higher divergent- thinking fluency scores than schizophrenic patients. Unfortunately, 
this study did not distinguish among patients with anxiety, depression, or personality disorders, making it 
difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship between anxiety and creativity. Fluency is also a 
controversial indicator of creativity (Silvia et al., 2008). 
 
Other studies have examined shyness, a common and subclinical region of the social anxiety spectrum (McNeil, 
2001). For example, in a study of preschoolers, Kemple, David, and Wang (1996) found that teachers’ ratings of 
―curiosity and creativity‖ covaried with teachers’ and mothers’ ratings of the child’s shyness: shy preschoolers, 
on average, received lower ratings of creative and curious behaviors. Similarly, in a small-sample study of 
female college students, Cheek and Stahl (1986) found that shyness predicted less creativity in a poem-writing 
task. Taken together, these studies suggest that shyness (and by extension social anxiety) may be associated 
with less creativity. 
 
Negative Affect and Creativity 
A different way to look at negative mood disorders is to consider what they have in common. Depression, 
anxiety, and social anxiety have unique symptoms that distinguish them from each other. Their shared features, 
however, can be equally interesting. Clark and Watson (1991) proposed that depression and anxiety can be 
modeled in terms of unique and common features. In this tripartite model, depression’s anhedonic symptoms 
and anxiety’s somatic activation symptoms are distinct, and feelings of global distress and negative affect are 
shared by depression and anxiety (and several other disorders; Watson et al., 1995). The global negative affect 
dimension and the disorder-specific dimensions can thus relate differently to other constructs. 
 
The higher-order negative affect spectrum may relate to creativity in ways that the lower- order spectrums do 
not. So far, this kind of hierarchical model has not been tested in creativity research, but indirect evidence 
comes from research on neuroticism and creativity. Neuroticism represents a broad disposition to experience 
negative emotional states (McCrae & Costa, 1999). It strongly predicts clinical and subclinical manifestations of 
mood disorders, among many other disorders (Kimbrel, 2008; Watson, 2000), and it can serve as a proxy for the 
global negative affect factor described by Clark and Watson (1991; see Silvia & Warburton, 2006). 
 
In recent studies (Batey, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2009; Furnham & Bachtiar, 2008), openness and 
extraversion predicted divergent-thinking fluency, everyday creative behaviors, and self-rated creativity, but 
neuroticism did not. This study seems to be typical. In a wide-ranging review, Batey and Furnham (2006) found 
only scattered examples of neuroticism as a predictor of creativity; they suggest that neuroticism may be 
important in only some creative domains, such as the fine arts, whereas openness to experience and extraversion 
consistently predict creativity despite differences in domains, tasks, and designs. 
 
The Present Study 
The present study explored the relationships between the dimensions of depression, anxiety, and social anxiety 
and many aspects of creativity. Dimensional models, also known as spectrum or continuum models, presume 
meaningful variability along a continuum of impairment. Clinical psychology’s long-running debate over types 
versus dimensions isn’t something we can settle here—or something that clinical psychologists can settle over 
there (De Boeck, Wilson, & Acton, 2005)—but it is important to be clear about the assumptions and 
commitments that a dimensional approach makes (Schuldberg, 2000-2001). 
 
For most disorders, few people will meet clinical criteria for a diagnosis, but many people will show some of 
the disorder’s symptoms and features, albeit less often and less intensely. For example, relatively few people 
have clinical levels of social phobia, but most people report occasional feelings of shyness and nervousness 
around other people, ruminative thoughts about rejection, irrational social fears, and anxious feelings when 
faced with an audience. Similarly, full-blown schizophrenia has a low base rate, but many people experience 
aberrant thoughts and deviant sensory experiences (Kwapil, Barrantes-Vidal, & Silvia, 2008). Thus, one of the 
primary advantages of dimensional models over categorical models is that categorical clinical–subclinical 
models lose much of the variability in people’s behavior and experience. 
 
For our outcomes, we explored many senses of creativity. Theories of creativity don’t agree on much, but they 
do agree that there is no one sense in which someone is creative (Beghetto & Kaufman, 2007). Creativity can be 
viewed in terms of everyday ―little c‖ creative behaviors, ―Big C‖ creative accomplishments, creative cognitive 
styles and thought processes, creative beliefs, creative personality traits, and creative contexts and cultures 
(Kaufman & Beghetto, 2009; Richards, 2007; Sawyer, 2006; Weisberg, 2006). We measured several of these 
facets, including creative cognition (assessed with divergent thinking tasks; Silvia et al., 2008), everyday 
creative behaviors (Dollinger, 2007), creative accomplishments in different domains (Carson, Peterson, & 
Higgins, 2005), and creative self-beliefs (whether people viewed themselves as creative people; Kaufman & 
Baer, 2004). By casting a broad net, we hoped to give each side in the debate a fair shot. 
 
Our statistical analyses emphasized two things that haven’t received enough attention in past creativity research. 
First, we estimated most of the constructs as latent variables rather than observed variables. As quantitative 
psychologists point out, most variables that can be modeled as latent variables should be (e.g., Coffman & 
McCallum, 2005; Skrondal & Rabe-Hesketh, 2004). By modeling error variance, latent variable models can 
separate true scores from error, thereby increasing our confidence in the accuracy of the estimates. 
 
Second, we emphasized effect sizes rather than statistical significance. Instead of  answering the ―yes or no‖ 
question of significance, research in this area should answer the ―how big‖ question. Significance tests are 
heavily influenced by sample size: with a large sample, even small effects will be statistically significant. 
Because latent variable studies require large samples, they tend to find many tiny-but-significant effects. To 
enhance the information provided by effect sizes, researchers can estimate confidence intervals for the effects. 
These intervals illustrate the range of effect sizes that researchers could realistically expect in similar studies 
with similar samples. 
 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 202 students enrolled in General Psychology at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
participated and received credit toward a research option. We excluded non-native English speakers, people 
with extensive missing data, and participants with predefined patterns of aberrant responses (e.g., marking the 
midpoint for all items). Our final sample thus consisted of 189 people, which was made up of 150 women 
(79%) and 39 men (21 %). Based on self-identified ethnicity, the sample consisted mostly of Caucasian (69%) 
and African-American (26%) students. 
 
Procedure 
People took part in groups of 2 to 10 people. After arriving at the lab and completing a consent form, they 
learned that the study was about creativity and different aspects of people’s backgrounds, personalities, and 
attitudes. People expected to complete some creativity tasks and then fill out a questionnaire. The study took 
around 45 minutes. 
 
Tasks and Measures 
Divergent Thinking 
People completed three divergent thinking tasks. We used the administration and scoring procedure described 
by Silvia et al. (2008). People were asked to generate unusual uses for a brick, a knife, and a box. They were 
told that the tasks concerned creativity and that they should try to come up with ―unusual, creative, and 
uncommon‖ uses. Each task lasted three minutes. After the task, the experimenter asked people to look at their 
responses and then circle their two most creative ones. 
 
These tasks yield two scores. First, fluency is scored by simply counting the number of responses. Second, 
creativity is scored by having raters score each response on a 1–5 scale. This study used four raters, who were 
undergraduate research assistants who had been trained in the scoring method developed by our research group 
(Silvia et al., 2008). The responses are entered into a spreadsheet, corrected for spelling errors, and then sorted 
alphabetically. The raters are thus unaware of who gave a response, the number of other responses the person 
gave, whether the response was picked as a ―top two‖ response, the person’s scores on any other task or scale, 
or even the person’s handwriting. Each rater scored each response. The creativity score uses only the responses 
picked as the top two: people are judged based on what they saw as their best responses (Michael & Wright, 
1989; Silvia, 2008b). In our recent work, we have found that the top-two scores have larger effect sizes than 
other scoring methods, such as scoring all of the responses and using their average score (Silvia et al., 2008) or 
simply giving the entire set of responses a single holistic score (Silvia, Martin, & Nusbaum, 2009). 
 
The scoring details are reported in the text and appendix of the earlier paper (Silvia et al., 2008). To date, 
research has provided solid evidence for the validity of this approach: the creativity scores predict dimensions 
of personality (e.g., openness to experience; Silvia et al., 2008; Silvia, Nusbaum, Berg, Martin, & O’Conner, in 
press), fluid intelligence (Silvia, 2008a), and whether students have declared a creative college major or a 
conventional major (Silvia et al., 2008). 
 
Creative Self-Concepts 
To measure people’s creative self-concepts, we used Kaufman and Baer’s (2004) 9-item Creativity Scale for 
Different Domains (CSDD). This scale asks people to report their level of creativity in eight domains, such as 
―How creative are you in the area of art?‖ and ―How creative are you in the area of interpersonal 
communication?‖ Eight items assess specific domains; a final item—―How creative would you say you are in 
general?‖—measures global self-views of creativity. People respond to each item on a 1–5 scale (endpoints: Not 
at all creative, Very creative). Kaufman and Baer (2004) suggested that the domain items form three factors: a 
math/science factor, an empathy/communication factor, and a hands-on creativity factor.  
 
Everyday Creativity 
To measure everyday creative behaviors, we used a version of Hocevar’s Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI) 
that was abbreviated by Dollinger (2007; Dollinger, Burke, & Gump 2007). This 28-item scale asks people to 
report how often, in their ―adolescent and adult life,‖ they have done various creative behaviors, such as wrote a 
short story, designed and made a costume, wrote the lyrics to a song, and built a hanging mobile. On the whole, 
the items capture the domains of arts, crafts, and creative writing. For most of the items, people are instructed 
not to count behaviors done to meet a course requirement. People use a 4-point ordinal scale: A = Never did 
this, B = Did this once or twice, C = Did this 3 to 5 times, and D = More than 5 times.  
 
Creative Achievement 
To measure lifetime creative achievements, we used the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ), a 10-
domain scale that measures self-reported accomplishments (Carson, Peterson, & Higgins, 2005). For each 
domain, people respond to items that increase in the level of accomplishment. The items emphasize objective, 
public, and observable accomplishments. Although new, this scale has performed well in several studies (Hirsh 
& Peterson, 2008; Mar, DeYoung, Higgins, & Peterson, 2006; Silvia, Kaufman, & Pretz, in press). The scoring 
of the CAQ is innovative and complex; for details, see Carson et al. (2005). The scale was designed to yield 
highly skewed distributions, in which most people have no or few accomplishments, and it captures a broader 
range of creative accomplishment than the CBI. 
 
Mood Disorder Symptoms 
We measured depression and anxiety symptoms with the Depression and Anxiety subscales of the Depression 
Anxiety Stress Scales (DASS; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995). The DASS is a widely-used tool for measuring the 
distinct symptoms of anxiety and depression in both clinical and subclinical samples (e.g., Antony, Beiling, 
Cox, Enns, & Swinson, 1998; Brown, Chorpita, Korotitsch, & Barlow, 1997; Lovibond, 1998). The depression 
subscale has 14 items (e.g., ―I felt that I had lost interest in just about everything‖; ―I felt sad and depressed‖) 
that emphasize depressive anhedonia. The anxiety subscale has 14 items (e.g., ―I felt scared without any good 
reason‖; ―I found myself in situations which made me so anxious I was most relieved when they ended‖) that 
emphasize somatic feelings of tension and nervousness. The DASS is recommended in several reviews because 
it discriminates between anxiety and depression reasonably well (Beuke, Fischer, & McDowall, 2003). People 
were instructed to rate how well the statements described how they felt during the past week (1 = disagree 
strongly, 5 =agree strongly). 
 
We measured the social anxiety spectrum with the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, a 20- item self-report scale 
(Mattick & Clarke, 1998). This scale is widely-used in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Heimberg, 
Mueller, Holt, Hope, & Liebowitz, 1992; Herbert, Rheingold, & Brandsma, 2001; Osman, Gutierrez, Barrios, 
Kopper, & Chiros, 1998), and it is a standard tool in research on the social anxiety spectrum (e.g., Kashdan & 
Roberts, 2004; Silvia, Allan, Beauchamp, Maschauer, & Workman, 2006). The items capture feelings of 
awkwardness, tension, and anxiety around other people (e.g., ―I become tense if I have to talk about myself or 
my feelings‖; ―When mixing in a group, I find myself worrying I will be ignored‖). People completed the scale 
using a 5-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
 
Results 
Statistical Models 
The statistical models were estimated using Mplus 5.2, with full-information maximum likelihood and robust 
standard errors (MLR). Few observations were missing: for most analyses, the covariance coverage was 100%. 
 
We modeled depression, anxiety, and social anxiety as latent variables. For depression and anxiety, we formed 
3 parcels (two 5-item parcels and one 4-item parcel) from the 14 items. For social anxiety, we formed four 5-
item parcels from the 20 items. The parcels were formed via item order (e.g., the first five items formed the first 
parcel). Analyses of internal consistency for the scales as a whole and for the parcels showed that parceling 
didn’t seem to introduce local dependence (Coffman & McCallum, 2005; Sass & Smith, 2006).
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 We fixed the 
latent variances to 1. We modeled negative affect as a higher-order latent variable indicated by the latent 
anxiety, depression, and social anxiety variables. The path to social anxiety was fixed to 1. A confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) found evidence for good fit (CFI = .975, RMSEA = .064, SRMR = .032), based on 
standard fit cutoffs (e.g., Kline, 2005). 
 
Divergent Thinking 
Did anxiety and depression symptoms predict divergent thinking? We estimated effects for both fluency (the 
number of responses) and creativity (the rated quality of the top-two responses). People completed three tasks, 
so fluency was treated as a latent variable with three indicators. Table 1 shows the standardized effects, which 
represent effect sizes, and their 95% confidence intervals. The first fluency model estimated the effects of 
depression, anxiety, and social anxiety on fluency. These three variables explained only 2.1% of the variance in 
fluency, and the effect sizes were generally small. A second fluency model estimated the effect of the higher-
order negative affect variable on fluency. Negative affect explained only 1.3% of the variance in fluency (see 
Table 1). 
 
To analyze the creativity of the responses, we formed three latent variables, one for each divergent thinking task 
(i.e., brick, knife, and box). Each variable had four indicators, one for each rater’s ―top two‖ ratings. The path to 
the first rater was fixed at 1. These three latent variables served as indicators for a higher-order ―creativity‖ 
variable, which had a variance fixed to 1. In short, we estimated the higher-order variable that explained why 
the three divergent thinking tasks covaried. A CFA of this measurement model showed good fit (CFI = .971, 
RMSEA = .049, SRMR = .045). 
 
The faceted design—four raters crossed by three tasks—makes traditional reliability statistics (e.g., Cronbach’s 
alpha) inappropriate (Drewes, 2000). Moreover, there is controversy over whether divergent thinking tasks are 
interchangeable—they seem to represent fixed rather than random effects (Almeida, Prieto, Ferrando, Oliveira, 
& Ferrándiz, 2008; Silvia et al., 2008, Study 1). For the present design, an analogous and appropriate reliability 
statistic is maximal reliability (Drewes, 2000), known as H, which represents ―the degree to which the 
indicators can capture information about the underlying factor‖ (Gagné & Hancock, 2006, p. 68). Like 
Cronbach’s alpha, H expresses reliability in a 0 to 1 range, with higher values indicating higher reliability. 
Unlike alpha, H does not require tau-equivalent (equally weighted) items—instead, it estimates the reliability of 
the most reliable weighted composite that could be estimated from the data. The H reliability estimates were 
good: they were larger than .80 for the brick (H = .89), knife (H = . 89), and box (H = . 81) tasks. 
 
The first model estimated the effects of depression, anxiety, and social anxiety on creativity ratings. These three 
variables explained only 2.2% of the variance, and the effect sizes were small. A model that estimated the effect 
of the higher-order negative affect variable showed equally small effects. Negative affect explained only 1.5% 
of the variance in creativity (see Table 1). 
 
Creative Self-Concept 
Did mood disorder symptoms predict people’s beliefs about whether they are creative? We analyzed the effects 
of the symptom variables on Kaufman and Baer’s (2004) CSDD scale. We formed subscale scores for the three 
factors suggested by Kaufman and Baer—a math– science factor, an empathy–communication factor, and a 
hands-on creativity factor—by averaging the items associated with each factor. The global self-judgment item 
(―How creative would you say you are in general?‖) was analyzed separately. 
 
We estimated a multivariate model: the symptom dimensions were predictors, and the four CSDD scores (three 
domains and one global item) were outcomes. Table 1 displays the effects. The depression, anxiety, and social 
anxiety variables explained small amounts of variance in global self-judgments of creativity (1.1%) and in the 
math–science (2.8%) and hands- on creativity domains (2.5%). In contrast, for the empathy–communication 
domain, 16.6% of the variance was explained. Social anxiety was the major predictor: people high in social 
anxiety rated themselves as less creative in this domain (~β~β = -.364). 
The higher-order negative affect variable explained little variance in global self- judgments of creativity (0.1%) 
or in the domains of math–science (2.8%), hands-on activities (0.4%), and empathy–communication (9.8%), 
although the last domain had the highest percentage (see Table 1). 
 
Everyday Creativity 
Did mood disorder symptoms predict everyday creative behaviors? We explored how the symptom dimensions 
predicted the Creative Behavior Inventory (CBI). Because the CBI’s response format is ordinal, we modeled the 
scale as a latent variable indicated by 28 ordered- categorical (ordinal) items. To simplify the model, we 
constrained the items’ factor loadings to be equal and fixed the factor’s variance to 1. (IRT fans will recognize 
this as a one-parameter graded-response model; Samejima, 1997.) 
 
Depression, anxiety, and social anxiety explained 5.0% of the variance in everyday creative behaviors. The 
effect sizes were small (see Table 1), although the effect size for anxiety was in the small-to-medium range. 
Global negative affect explained 3.5% of the variance and had a small effect size. 
 
Creative Achievements 
So far, we have not seen strong relations between mood disorder dimensions and creative cognition, self-
concepts, and behaviors. What about creative achievements? We explored whether the symptom dimensions 
predicted scores on the Creative Achievement Questionnaire (CAQ). Analyzing the CAQ is tricky because its 
scores are non-normal. Some researchers have created an overall score by averaging the 10 domain scores and 
applying a natural-log transformation (Hirsh & Peterson, 2008). Table 1 shows the effects of the symptom 
dimensions on the CAQ average. Depression, anxiety, and social anxiety explained only 1.5% of the variance in 
CAQ scores; global negative affect explained only 1.3%. 
 
But a problem with a simple average is that the 10 domains do not hang together. Exploratory factor analyses 
find two or three factors (Carson et al., 2005), and latent class analyses find three major profiles of achievement 
(Silvia et al., in press). Because the present study is exploratory, we analyzed the 10 CAQ domains individually. 
The domain scores are highly skewed: zero is the modal score for most of the domains. The distributions thus 
resemble Poisson (count) distributions with too many zeros, known as overdispersed Poisson distributions. Such 
distributions violate conventional regression assumptions of normal residuals and homoscedasticity, so other 
models are needed. Negative binomial models can model count processes for overdispersed outcomes (Hilbe, 
2007; Long, 1997), so they are useful models for analyzing the CAQ domain scores.
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Table 2 displays the relationships between the mood disorder variables and CAQ scores. (Note that the 
coefficients are unstandardized Poisson coefficients, which lack the intuitive interpretation of conventional raw 
and standardized regression weights.) Only two significant relationships were found between any of the mood 
disorder dimensions and any of the 10 domains of creative achievement. First, social anxiety predicted fewer 
achievements in Dance and marginally fewer in Theater and Film. These effects are consistent with research 
showing that people with high scores in the performing arts domains are more extraverted (Silvia et al., in press, 
Study 1). Second, global negative affect predicted fewer achievements in Architectural Design. We suspect, 
however, that this effect is spurious—93% of the scores were zeros, and only five people had scores greater 
than 1. Any relationship is thus carried by a tiny part of the sample. Consistent with our interpretation, an 
analysis that treated the scores as ordered categories found no significant effects. 
 
Coherence of Predictors and Outcomes 
The analyses of anxiety and depression dimensions and facets of creativity present a clear picture, albeit a blank 
one: neither the specific dimensions nor the higher-order dimension has much to do with any of the facets of 
creativity measured in the present research. The models explain little variance, and the effect sizes are very 
small, with only a few exceptions. When a multivariate study finds few effects, it is worth considering if the 
measurement went horribly awry. The null effects may represent measurement failures rather than genuine null 
effects. For example, a bias in sampling, a lack of variability, or a violation of a scale’s valid use could lead to 
null effects. 
 
We can triangulate on the null effects by examining the internal coherence of the set of predictors and the set of 
outcomes (cf. Silvia, Eichstaedt, & Phillips, 2005). First, the measures of negative mood symptoms covaried as 
they should. The latent social anxiety variable correlated highly with the latent depression (r = .456) and anxiety 
variables (r = .452), which in turn correlated highly with each other (r = .745). Both the effect sizes and their 
pattern are consistent with past work: anxiety and depression should (and do) covary more with each other than 
with other mood symptoms (Watson, 2000). 
 
Second, the measures of creativity covaried as they should, based on past research. The latent CBI variable and 
the averaged CAQ scores—the two measures of creative achievement— correlated r = .598. The CSDD scale’s 
global creativity item correlated with the CBI scale (r = .515) and with the CAQ (r = .434), so people’s creative 
self-concepts covaried with rated behaviors and achievements. Finally, the latent divergent-thinking creativity 
scores correlated with CSDD self-ratings (r = .147) and with CBI (r = .167) and CAQ scores (r = .214). The 
relations between divergent thinking and creative achievement are consistent with a recent meta- analysis (Kim, 
2008), which found an overall relationship of r = .22 between divergent thinking and accomplishments. This 
pattern is coherent: the two measures of creative behavior have the highest correlation, consistent with their 
shared trait and method, and the constructs that differ in trait and method (i.e., divergent thinking and self-rated 
achievement) have lower effects. 
 
In sum, the predictor variables covary internally and the outcome variables covary internally. Thus, it is 
unlikely that something went awry with the assessment, sampling, or variance because major mistakes or flaws 
would not be limited to predictor–outcome covariance. Instead, it seems more likely that the consistently small 
effects are good estimates of the true effect sizes. Consequently, researchers studying similar samples should 
expect that anxiety and depression symptoms will have small (if any) effects on measures of creativity. 
 
General Discussion 
Do anxiety and depression predict creativity? The findings from the present study clearly 
favored the skeptical camp (Schlesinger, in press; Weisberg, 2006). The dimensions of anxiety and depression 
explained small amounts of variance in creativity, regardless of whether creativity was viewed as divergent 
thinking, creative self-concepts, everyday creative behaviors, or public creative achievements. Moreover, the 
few notable effects we found were not especially shocking: people high in social anxiety viewed themselves as 
less creative in the interpersonal domain and reported fewer achievements in areas requiring public 
performance. 
 
We should note, however, that our research attempted to address this question by employing an uncommon 
approach. Specifically, we chose to examine anxiety and depression as continuous dimensions of symptoms 
rather than as clinical categories. We also measured multiple facets of creativity, and we modeled the variables 
with robust methods: latent variable models for all analyses, negative binomial models for the CAQ, ordinal 
CFA for the CBI, and multivariate SEM for the CSDD. Finally, we emphasized effect sizes and their confidence 
intervals, which offer more information than simple significance levels. 
 
Looking Where the Light is Dimmest 
Creativity research has not spent much time examining the anxiety and depression dimensions relative to the 
bipolar and schizotypal dimensions. Our findings show that this neglect is probably reasonable. Motivational 
models of creativity would suggest that we were looking where the light was dimmest. Creative behavior, 
viewed broadly, is appetitive and approach-oriented: creative people seek out people and activities that afford 
novel, unusual, and complex behaviors. People who find behavioral novelty and variability rewarding will have 
a motivational architecture that promotes approaching new, unusual things (Silvia, 2006). In contrast, 
depressive anhedonia essentially represents the absence of appetitive behavior, whereas anxiety and social 
anxiety would be expected to inhibit appetitive and novelty-seeking behavior (Kimbrel, 2008). Thus, from a 
motivational perspective, it is not surprising that anxiety and depression didn’t predict higher levels of creative 
action. Indeed, from this perspective, one might actually expect to find a negative relationship between certain 
forms of creative behavior and the constructs of anxiety and depression, and, in fact, our findings suggest this 
may be the case in a few instances (e.g., the negative relationship between social anxiety and dance). Generally 
speaking, though, the results were clear—the dimensions of anxiety and depression explained fairly small 
amounts of variance in creativity, regardless of how it was measured. 
 
Although there is not much work on anxiety and depression in the creativity literature, there is a large body of 
work examining the relationship between the Big Five and creativity (Batey & Furnham, 2006). This literature, 
particularly the findings for neuroticism and creativity, is a clue that researchers should not expect to find strong 
effects for anxiety and depression. Neuroticism is a good proxy for Watson’s (2000) notion of negative affect, a 
global variable representing distress and proneness to negative emotional states. According to Batey and 
Furnham’s (2006) review, few studies have found links between neuroticism and creativity. Instead, the traits 
associated with appetitive motivation (extraversion) and behavioral variability (openness to experience) show 
large, consistent effects across creative domains. 
 
Some Perspective 
Research on creativity and mental illness has occasionally succumbed to grandiosity, in which too much is 
made of the findings of a single study. The framework suggested by Silvia and Kaufman (in press) provides 
some perspective on our findings. First, the question ―Is creativity related to mental illness?‖ is too big to 
answer. There are many forms of creativity, and there are many types of mental illness. These facts make a 
simple ―yes‖ or ―no‖ answer to such a broad question untenable. Thus, we would not claim that anxiety and 
depression have nothing to do with creativity. Instead, we would claim that in samples of young adults, the 
effects of anxiety and depression symptoms on dimensional measures of creative thought and action range from 
small to non-significant. 
 
Second, Silvia and Kaufman pointed out classes of methods that correspond to different questions. One method 
samples creative people and assesses mental illness; it asks ―Do creative people tend to be mentally ill?‖ A 
second method samples mentally ill people and assesses creativity; it asks ―Do mentally ill people tend to be 
creative?‖ And a third method assesses the covariance of creativity and mental illness in broad, unselected 
samples; it asks ―Do creativity variables and mental health variables covary?‖ These methods correspond to 
different statistical models—Bayesian conditional probabilities for the first two, and covariance structure 
models for the third. Hence, each method affords different claims and conclusions. It’s possible for the different 
methods to yield conflicting findings. For example, a study of clinical samples may find less creativity 
(Rubenstein, 2008), but a study of creative samples may find more mental illnesses (Andreasen, 1987). 
 
In considering the boundaries of the present research, then, researchers should keep in mind the kinds of claims 
that the spectrum method can address. It seems unlikely, based on our findings, that the dimensions of 
depression, anxiety, and social anxiety have strong relationships with dimensions of creativity. We found small 
effects; moreover, the confidence intervals around these effects usually included zero (indicating a non-
significant effect) and rarely included large effects (indicating that observing large effects is unlikely). In 
similar research with similar samples, we doubt that researchers will find appreciably different effects. We 
would, however, anticipate different findings with clinical samples or with creative samples. We would not 
expect these differences simply because ―different things are different,‖ but because spectrum models answer a 
different kind of question. 
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Footnotes 
1. Studies of mood disorders commonly find positively skewed distributions of scores: people tend to 
have low values on measures of negative affective symptoms. Our sample showed this skew, which can pose a 
problem for model convergence and parameter estimation. We explored many modeling options, such as 
specifying the individual items as indicators, treating the items as ordinal and estimating the latent variables via 
1PL Rasch models, bootstrapping the standard errors, and using weighted least squares (e.g., mean and variance 
adjusted WLS) instead of maximum likelihood. These methods didn’t appreciably change the structure, 
interpretation, or covariance of the latent variables, although several of them caused convergence problems of 
their own. 
2. For all models, we examined measures of outliers and influence. One outlier was excluded for the 
analysis of the CAQ Architectural Design subscale; two outliers were excluded for the Creative Writing 
subscale. Normal Poisson regression was used for the Humor subscale because a negative binomial model 
would not converge. 
 
 
